Results for dbon

:minidisc: Simple Embeddable Persistence JSON Storage

TOTP (RFC 6238) authenticator-app second factor for noy-db — generate secrets, otpauth:// provisioning URIs, and constant-time code verification. Zero dependencies (HMAC-SHA1 via Web Crypto). Part of the @noy-db/on-* authentication family.

OAuth/OIDC bridge for noy-db — federated login (LINE, Google, Apple, Okta) with split-key key connector — server never sees plaintext

Magic-link unlock for noy-db — one-time URL that opens a vault in a viewer-scoped session without a passphrase. Part of the @noy-db/on-* authentication family.

Threat-response primitives for noy-db — multi-attempt lockout, duress-passphrase data destruction, duress-passphrase honeypot decoy. Pure stateful helpers; the caller coordinates keyring + audit-ledger integration. Part of the @noy-db/on-* authentication

Session-resume PIN quick-lock for noy-db — after a full passphrase unlock, a short-lived PIN (or a per-device biometric) re-unlocks the cached DEKs without re-typing the passphrase. PIN never replaces the passphrase; only resumes an already-unlocked sessi

Email OTP second factor for noy-db — generates time-boxed one-time codes, delivers via a user-supplied transport (SMTP / SES / Postmark / any fn), and verifies in constant time. Part of the @noy-db/on-* authentication family.

One-time printable recovery codes for noy-db — last-resort vault unlock when the passphrase, passkey, and OIDC provider are all unavailable. Base32 + checksum codes, PBKDF2-derived wrapping keys, burn-on-use. Part of the @noy-db/on-* authentication family

WebAuthn hardware-key keyrings for noy-db — Touch ID, Face ID, Windows Hello, YubiKey, FIDO2 passkeys

k-of-n Shamir Secret Sharing of the vault KEK for multi-party unlock. Any K of N shares recombines the key; fewer than K leaks zero bits. Composable — each share can be protected by any other on-* method. Zero runtime dependencies.